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Is GOD TIMELESS? 
A REPLY TO LAURENCE WOOD 
..... 
ALAN G PADGETT 
I am grateful for the opportunity to reply to Laurence Wood's earlier article on 
the eternal nature of God. ' A brief reply like this one necessarily focuses upon 
disagreements. I want to begin, therefore, with an affirmation: on the central themes 
of Christian theology, Dr. Wood and I are in agreement. I imagine this short note as 
a dialogue on something we disagree about: divine timelessness. 
While his article takes aim at "open theism" and the work of Richard Swinbume, 
Wood also includes some discussion of my own work, as well as that of other 
philosophers and scientists. I believe it is important for our readers to gain a clear 
understanding of the altemative viewpoints available to them with respect to the 
doctrine of divine eternity, and of divine omniscience. This will require not only 
setting out the several options available, but correcting Wood's presentation of 
things in a few places where I believe he is mistaken in his analysis. I will focus on 
two large areas of disagreement: (I) theories of eternity and omniscience, and 
(2) the interpretation of relativity theory. 
I. THEORIES OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND ETERNITY. 
At the very start of his article, Wood switches easily- rather too easily-between 
divine eternity and divine omniscience. These are distinct doctrines, and should not 
be confused or simply lumped together even when we are investigating their 
undoubted conceptual connections. There are at least three theories of divine 
eternity, and four main views of divine foreknowledge. Even these do not exhaust 
all the options. Yet Wood's essay reads as if our only choices were between a 
traditional view and Open Theism. These are not the only theories. I for one reject 
them both, as do other experts in this field such as William Lane Craig. 
The three main doctrines of eternity are the traditional doctrine of absolute 
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timelessness; the biblical view of everlasting etemity; and the view I have defended, called 
"relative timelessness." The third view, relative timelessness, is a difficult one to 
understand. According to this theory God is temporal in some sense, yet also transcends 
in some ways our space-time universe. I reject the traditional view of timeless etemity, as 
does Swinbume and Craig. for powerful philosophical reasons that Wood overlooks in his 
article. To be brief, the traditional view of divine etemity is incoherent with a theology of 
a living God, and a philosophy of time in which time is dynamic (that is, a process theory 
of time) Wood makes it clear that he accepts the process or dynamic theory of time in a 
long footnote at the end of his article (p. 46 n. 254), Now Wood believes in a living God, 
who is active in history. Therefore, I submit that Wood's view of divine etemity (which is 
similar to that of Boethius) is incoherent. In other words, the belief that past, present and 
future are real ontological differences, and the belief that all of the past, present and 
future are present to God in a timeless etemity, along with the belief that God acts in 
history- these three beliefs cannot all be true. They are logically inconsistent. This at least is 
the conclusion I reached in my 1992 study, Cod, Eternity and the Nature of Time, and I 
have found no reason to change my mind in the last decade. It is this incoherence which 
Wood needs to address if he is really to defend Boethius against modern critics. 
Unfortunately, these arguments are never mentioned in his article. 
Turning to the doctrine of omniscience: the theories of divine foreknowledge are 
divided into two camps? Some philosophers and theologians (like Swinbume) argue for a 
limited divine foreknowledge. On this view, even God cannot know the full reality of 
future free and contingent events. The other camp contains all those who believe God 
does have full foreknowledge. They differ, however, as to how God knows the future. 
Their disagreement is about the mode of divine foreknowledge. For some theologians, 
God's foreknowledge is based upon his timeless eternity. This is Wood's view, and is also 
the view of Boethius. For others, God's foreknowledge is based upon God's will, that is, 
upon God's predestination. This would be a Calvinist view. Finally, some philosophers 
today argue for scientia media, a "middle knowledge" on the basis of which God knows all 
future events. This view was first put forward by Luis de Molina in the seventeenth centu-
ry, and is known as Molinism. So there are several theories about just how God does 
know future free and contingent events. 
Given this diversity of viewpoints, I object to Wood's claim that my theology has "no 
conceptual tools to explain how" God can know the future (p. 45). There are more 
options than Wood's notion of divine timelessness as the basis for God's foreknowledge. 
Plenty of excellent philosophers and theologians have rejected Wood's view of timeless 
divine eternity, and still held on to divine foreknowledge of all future events. 
II. RELATIVITY THEORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF TIME. 
There are a number of philosophical issues in Wood's article having to do with the 
interpretation of modern physics. Much of what he says is correct, but his interpretation is 
one-sided. Once again, there exists a diversity of viewpoints which Wood failed to 
explicate in his essay. He assumes that only one philosophy of time is consistent with 
modern physics, but in his remarks he draws upon two conflicting viewpoints. Let me 
explain this a bit further. 
Is God Timeless? 7 
While all philosophers of time today want to take seriously the results of modem 
physics, there are still two main camps with respect to the reality of past, present, and 
future. One camp, variously known as the B-theory, "tenseless" time, or the stasis theory 
of time, argues that past, present and future are purely subjective or mind-clependent. For 
the stasis theory, time is real as before-and-after or as a physical measurement, but 
temporal process is not part of objective reality. On the other hand, several scientists and 
philosophers argue for a dynamic or process theory of time. For them, even while the 
measure of time is relative, there is a genuine ontological distinction between past, 
present, and future. The flow of time is not merely subjective. 
Both of these theories are consistent with modem physics. Wood appears to believe 
that there is only a choice between Newton and Einstein, as if the General Theory of 
Relativity leads automatically to the stasis theory of time. Such an assumption is 
unjustified. I object to the statement made by Wood that "Padgett misunderstands the 
implications of relativity theory" (p. 46 n. 253) simply because I have argued against the 
viewpoint he prefers. My main publications on this topic, and the arguments I make, are 
neither discussed nor cited.3 Further, Swinburne and Craig have written even more on 
this topic than I have, yet their books are not discussed or even mentioned in a footnote.' 
It is unfortunate that an essay which claims that Swinburne's views are "inconsistent with 
relativity physics and the big bang singularity" (p. 5) nowhere mentions his major books 
on just these topics. 
Swinburne's philosophy is fully consistent with modem physics, as his own work 
makes abundantly clear. I would make the same claim for my viewpoint, which makes 
no sense apart from relativity theory. In other words, not every scientist who is an expert 
in relativity theory will agree with Wood. To take a very recent example, the Oxford 
physicist Peter E. Hodgson has just published an explanatory article on "Relativity and 
Religion: The Abuse of Einstein's Theory."s He concludes his article with this observation: 
"It does make sense to talk of absolute time, and it may be possible to identify an absolute 
frame of reference. There is a real difference between past and future" (p. 409>' If 
Hodgson is right, then Wood is wrong. What may have happened is this: Wood has been 
misled by the writings of some scientists, who confuse their preferred interpretation of 
physics with physics itself. 
This leads me to my final question: which viewpoint does Wood accept, the process or 
the stasis theory of time? He takes ideas from both camps, but they cannot both be true. 
Either time travel is really possible according to the "law [sicl of relativity" (p. 30>, and our 
common sense notions of time and simultaneity have been "destroyed" by modem 
relativity theory [stasis theory); or else past, present and future are real ontological 
distinctions and not just mental experiences [process theoryJ. Either the process or the 
stasis theory of time is true: but not both. They contradict each other with respect to the 
ontological reality of temporal process (past, present and future) . Wood wants to claim 
that "both perceptions are true to the facts" (p. 3 I) but that is not possible. If God sees 
and acts timelessly upon all times (past, present, and future); if all events occur "at once" 
in eternity no matter when they occur within time, then either we are speaking nonsense 
or the stasis theory of time is being assumed. 
Even in this brief reply, we have discovered the complexities of contemporary debate 
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concerning divine foreknowledge and omniscience. It is not the case that the views of 
Boethius have been overlooked. Rather, his theory has been considered, debated, and 
rejected by many philosophers and theologians. While some scholars seek to defend 
Boethius (notably Brian Leftow), one cannot justly claim that his notion of timeless divine 
eternity has been ignored by either Swinburne or myself. 
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